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INTRODUCTION 
 
              The use of economic sciences tool for performing analyses of legal 
regulations  constitutes  one  manifestation  of  the  increasingly  frequent 
application of interdisciplinary research, whose primary goal is to achieve a 
new perspective on problems present within the scope of defined scientific 
fields, a multi-aspect approach to the examined phenomena and the creation 
of an increasingly cohesive knowledge system. The application of economic 
methods to law is nothing new. It is sufficient to point out that this has taken 
place  within  the  framework  of  Roman  Law,  Marxist  Theory  of  Law, 
American Legal Realism, Hermeneutics and methods for legal reasoning.1 
However, the beginnings of scientific trends of economic analysis of law in 
the  strict  sense  (Law  and  Economics)  date  back  to  the  1960s,  in  the 
scientific work performed by members of the so-called ‘Chicago school’.2 
Looking at law through the prism of economics quickly became a popular 
field  of  research,  which  included  within  its  scope  civil,  criminal, 
constitutional and insurance law.  
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The present article discusses a narrow fragment of these issues, and 
in particular certain aspects connected to economic analysis of the principles 
of liability in tort in the backdrop of liability for compensation for damage 
occurring as a result of the activities of one entity to the goods of another 
entity. Due to the limited framework of the present work, the discussion on 
the subject will not be exhaustive, but rather limited in scope to selected 
aspects. Within the remaining areas the reader will be referred to literature 
on the subject.3 Within the scope of the preliminary issues it should also be 
pointed out that the concept of liability principles us ed in the title of the 
article  will  not  be  understood  colloquially,  i.e.  in  a  broad  sense,  as 
encompassing the principles governing this liability, but in a rather narrow 
sense, as pertaining to such principles of the said liability as fault or risk.4 
Furthermore, as one would expect, due to the profile of the work, comments 
included within the article will focus on legal aspects and deductions of 
economic analysis as presented in the subject literature, and as such will 
constitute  the  basis  for  the  conclus ion.  Therefore,  as  regards  detailed 
mathematical issues the reader is referred to the extensive literature on the 
subject.5 
 
 
I. AN ANALYSIS OF A CLASSIC EXAMPLE OF CAUSING DAMAGE TO 
ANOTHER ENTITY AS A RESULT OF ONE’S OWN ACTIONS BASED ON 
EXAMPLES OF VEHICLE ACCIDENTS 
   
             Conducting  detailed  considerations  requires  an  introductory 
explanation to the effect that subsequent comments will substantially relate 
to model situations, frequently referred to in literature on the subject by the 
name of unilateral and bilateral accidents.6 In respect of the former, it is 
usually assumed that the danger of damage -causing events occurring is 
dependent solely upon the degree of carefulness on the part of the potential 
perpetrators  within  the  scope  of  their   actions  (employed  precautions), 
whereas the potentially aggrieved individuals have no influence over this 
situation,  or  the  role  of  this  factor  is  so  insignificant  that  it  can  be 
                                                 
3 Eg with reference to car accidents see in particular: S Shavell, An Economic Analysis of 
Accident Law  (Harvard University Press 1987);  S Shavell, Ekonomiczna analiza prawa 
wypadków  (Transformacje  Prawa  Prywatnego.  Numer  Amerykański,  Wydawnictwo 
Uniwersytetu Jagiellońskiego 2005,); S Shavell, ‘Liability for accidents’ in AM Polinsky 
and  S  Shavell  (eds),  Handbook  of  Law  and  Economics,  vol.  I,  (Elsevier  2007);  AM 
Polinsky, An Introduction to Law and Economics (2nd ed, Little, Brown and Company, 
Boston  and  Toronto  1983)  39-52;  EM  Landes,  ‘Insurance,  Liability  and  Accidents:  A 
Theoretical and Empirical Investigation of the Effect of No-Fault Accidents’ (1982) 25 JLE 
49-65; FA Sloan, BA Reilly and CM Schenzler, ‘Tort Liability versus Other Approaches 
for Deterring Careless Driving’ (1994) 1 IRLE 140-144. 
4 For more details on this approach see J Kuźmicka-Sulikowska, Zasady odpowiedzialności 
deliktowej w świetle nowych tendencji w ustawodawstwie polskim (Wolters Kluwer 2011) 
23-40. 
5 See eg: R Cooter and T Ulen, Ekonomiczna analiza prawa (J Bełdowski, J Czabański, K 
Metelska-Szaniawska, M Olender, and B Targański trs, CH Beck 2009) 395-500. 
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overlooked  without  affecting  the  outcome.7  On the other hand, bilateral 
accidents are those situations in which both the behaviour of the perpetrators 
as  well  as  the  aggrieved  influence  the  probability  of  occurrence  of  a 
damage-causing event. Thus in the latter case, the actions of both categories 
of entities and the carefulness a pplied by them influence the risk of the 
occurrence of damage, for example as a result of an accident. 8 Essentially, 
talking  about  unilateral  or  bilateral  accidents  constitutes  a  certain 
terminological simplification, as in actual fact this pertains to whe ther the 
possibility  of  employing  precautions  preventing  the  occurrence  of  an 
accident rests only on one of the parties or on both  ‘parties to the accident’ 
(that is, both its perpetrator and the aggrieved). That is why sometimes the 
concepts of unilateral and bilateral carefulness are used respectively,9 which 
reflects the model assumptions. Keeping this in mind, in the following 
sections of my reasoning I will alternatively apply those concepts, as well as 
those of  ‘unilateral accident’ and ‘bilateral accident’, in order to achieve 
conciseness and to avoid repetitions. 
              Moving  on  to  more  detailed  considerations,  it  should  be 
emphasised  that  both  in  the  case  of  unilateral  accidents  and  bilateral 
accidents, the goal set for the principles of tortious liability is the same; 
namely, to strive for minimisation of the total social costs associated with 
these events.10 It is true that a gradual increase in the level of carefulness 
leads to an appropriate reduction of the risk of occurrence of damage, a nd 
following on from this, only at the highest possible level of carefulness does 
the  maximum  reduction  of  this  risk  take  place.  However,  the  optimal 
situation is such a formulation of legal regulations and the adoption of such 
principles of tortious liability under which the costs of taking precautions 
will be profitable in the context of avoidance of accident risk, and thus the 
                                                 
7 However, sometimes it is assumed that within the framework of this model one of the 
parties, the perpetrator or aggrieved, may employ safety means preventing the occurrence 
of loss (for more on this issue see comments in section IA). 
8  In the literature sometimes even three mod els are assumed: unilateral, bilateral and 
multilateral, indicating that the basis for differentiating between them constitutes how the 
optimal level of carefulness is determined within their framework. In a unilateral model, 
such a level is achieved when  the tort perpetrator may reduce the expected level of losses 
by one unit in return for each unit of increased carefulness. In a bilateral model, one may 
speak of an optimal level of carefulness when each of the parties, thus both the tort 
perpetrator and the aggrieved, may reduce the expected losses by one unit through each one 
unit increment in the carefulness employed in their behaviour. In a multilateral model, it is 
assumed that the optimal level of carefulness occurs when each tort perpetrator and each  
aggrieved can lower the expected losses by a one -unit increase in the measure of their 
meticulousness (HB Schäfer and C Ott, The Economic Analysis of Civil Law (M Braham tr, 
Edward Elgar Publishing 2004) 115.  
9 Cooter and Ulen (n 5) 412. 
10 In this context, it should be pointed out that in the literature on the subject the following 
argument  is  raised:  ‘Economic  goal  of  liability  in  tort  constitutes  in  persuading  the 
perpetrator and aggrieved to internalize the costs of losses,  which  may ensue  from not 
employing  precautions.  Tort  law  internalizes  these  costs,  forcing  the  perpetrator  to 
compensate the aggrieved. When individuals, who may potentially cause loss, internalize 
these costs, that gives them incentives to invest in safety at an effective level. The economic 
concept  of  tort  law  constitutes  in  applying  the  principle  of  liability  to  internalise  the 
external effects occurring due to high transaction costs.’ (Cooter and Ulen (n 5) 393). 66  Wroclaw Review of Law, Administration & Economics  [Vol 2:2 
 
level of carefulness desirable from the point of view of social welfare does 
not necessarily have to be - and in fact usually is not - the highest achievable 
in practice.  
             In real life, accidents which fit into the unilateral model framework 
occur less frequently than those in the bilateral model, as it is rare that a 
given event classified as tort11 is dependent upon the actions of only one of 
the parties (e.g. the perpetrator), and the aggrieved is not able to employ any 
precautions in order to reduce the risk of suffering damage. More often, the 
other party  can also  employ certain precautions. 12  For this reason, the 
discussion on unilateral accidents will be briefer than that on bilateral ones. 
Nevertheless it is essential to examine them, especially as, given a certain 
measure of simplification indicated in the relevant subject literature, the 
principles governing them  can also be successfully applied in situations 
where the role of the aggrieved is slight and of minimum significance to the 
course  of  events.  A  significantly  greater  number  of  everyday  events 
resulting in the occurrence of damage to a person or property fit the bilateral 
model, and as such it will be discussed in greater detail. 
 
A. The unilateral model 
            In the case of the unilateral model, when the legislator assumes a 
lack of liability on the part of the perpetrator for the damage he causes, for 
obvious reasons the latter will not be careful within the scope of his actions. 
As  he  will  not  have  to  compensate  the  aggrieved  in  the  event  of  an 
occurrence  of  damage,  he  will  not  pay  any  attention  to  reducing  the 
probability of its occurrence. The entirety of the damage will remain exactly 
where it arose, that is to say there will be no allocation of costs associated 
with  the said  damage, the burden of which would  rest  on the aggrieved 
entity. Alternatively, if the perpetrator's liability is established and based on 
the  risk  principle,  he  is  motivated  to  choose  a  socially  optimal  level  of 
carefulness as only in this way will he be able to reduce the costs he incurs. 
In adopting the risk principle he is obliged to compensate for all damage he 
has  caused (assuming the conditions  for liability  are met, of course, but 
                                                 
11 Nota bene, within the framework of individual countries’ legal systems one may observe 
certain discrepancies between the scope of events qualified by regulations as torts (for more 
information see Ch von Bar, The Common European Law of Torts, vol. 1, The Core Areas 
of  Tort  Law,  its  Approximation  in  Europe,  and  its  Accomodation  in  the  Legal  System 
(Clarendon  Press  1998)  2-11;  J  Kuźmicka-Sulikowska,  Odpowiedzialność  deliktowa  w 
prawie wybranych państw obcych (Prawnicza i Ekonomiczna Biblioteka Cyfrowa 2011) 9-
12.  
12 Eg as a situation where only the potential loss perpetrator may employ safety means and 
the potentially aggrieved is devoid of such possibility, and thus as an example of the 
unilateral carefulness model, a situation where a surgeon is operating on an unconscious 
patient is given (Cooter and Ulen (n 5) 408). However, once the circumstances are altered, 
if the surgeon spoke to the patient beforehand about the illness and the necessity of invasive 
surgery, the situation  may  be different.  As even if the surgery  was conducted after 
pharmacological sedation of the patient and its course was in essence dependent upon the 
skills of the surgeon, then in such a case, if the patient had not provided significant 
information regarding illnesses from which he is suffering, medicines which he is taking or 
is allergic to during the earlier conversation with the doctor this may influence the course 
and success of the surgery. What follows is that the patient and potentially aggrieved party 
may have an opportunity to undertake certain precautions reducing the probability of the 
occurrence of loss. In such an event, it would be more appropriate to talk about a model of 
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regardless of whether he was at fault or not). On the other hand, establishing 
perpetrator liability for damage subject to the existence of fault on his part 
results in his being released from the burden of compensation only if he 
maintains at least the minimum level of carefulness, which is established by 
the courts in the course of applying the law. If the courts define the level of 
carefulness at a socially optimal level then the perpetrator of the damage 
will be inclined to  observe it.13  In such a case, potential perpetrators of 
damage will not undertake to observe higher standards of carefulness, as 
they will be rendered unprofitable when taking into account that there will 
be no risk of liability when a lower standard is met. However, neither will 
they  undertake  to  maintain  a  level  of carefulness  below  that  which  is 
sufficient, as then they would have to pay compensation for each case of 
damage caused.14  
              Thus the conclusion may be drawn that, within the framework of a 
unilateral accident model, both basing liability in tort on the principle of risk 
as well as of fault lead to socially optimal outcomes by motivating potential 
perpetrators to maintain an appropriate level of careful ness. During the 
evidentiary  phase  of  civil  proceedings  the  application  of  the  second 
principle leads to practical problems, requiring not only proof of the fact by 
which the damage was caused, the occurrence and scope of the damage and 
the causal relationship between these elements, but also the establishment 
by the court of a socially optimal level of appropriate carefulness and 
demonstration by the aggrieved that the perpetrator did not observe this 
level (this last element, however, is dependent upon th e solutions adopted 
within the given legal system and will be different if the legislator has 
introduced a presumption of fault). Thus taking into account the additional 
factor of administrative costs during deliberations results in the indicated 
balance between the principles of liability in tort being distorted for the 
benefit  of  the  principle  of  risk,  in  which  case  a  smaller  number  of 
circumstances require proving during court proceedings than in the case of 
liability dependent upon fault on the part of the perpetrator.15 
                                                 
13 SM Shavell, Law and Economics in HE Jackson, L Kaplow, SM Shavell, W Kip Viscusi 
and D Cope, Analytical Methods for Lawyers (Foundation Press 2003) 398. These authors 
emphasise that it is sufficient to apply perpetrator liability based on a simple principle of 
fault in the  form of  negligence  (the negligence rule),  without the  need to amend it by 
affording the defendant a possibility to plead that the aggrieved claimant acted negligently 
(the defense of contributory negligence), as the fault principle itself as justification for a 
tortfeasor’s liability is a sufficient stimulant to incline potential accident victims to employ 
appropriate meticulousness. This stems from the fact that as loss perpetrators, in order to 
avoid  liability,  will  maintain  appropriate  meticulousness,  then  the  aggrieved,  being 
conscious of the fact that the perpetrators will act in such manner and that the entire weight 
of the loss occurred will rest on the shoulders of the aggrieved, will also be inclined to 
maintain appropriate safety so that the probability of occurrence or scope of loss is reduced 
(Shavell, (n 13) 401.       
14 Shavell (n  3) 17; AM Polinsky, Introduction to Law and Economics (3rd  ed, Aspen 
Publishers 2003) 46.  
15  TJ  Miceli,  Economics  of  the  Law.  Torts,  contracts,  property,  litigation  (Oxford 
University Press 1997) 17. However, it should be noted that it is pointed out in the literature 
that adopting liability in tort based on the principle of fault results in a smaller number of 
claims pursued, as they are more difficult from a process point of view (the number of 68  Wroclaw Review of Law, Administration & Economics  [Vol 2:2 
 
               The  above  viewpoint  is  dominant,  but  is  not  the  only  one 
represented  in  the  literature.  A  slightly  different  standpoint  can  also  be 
found which is  applied to  events  that fit  the unilateral  model not  in  the 
manner in which it is presented above (i.e. situations where only the conduct 
of the perpetrator of the tort influences the level of danger of occurrence of 
damage, and the behaviour of the aggrieved does not play any role within 
this scope), but is applied to cases where only one entity has control over the 
factors which result in the occurrence of damage, the difference being that 
such entity can be either the tort perpetrator or the aggrieved. With such an 
understanding of unilateral accidents, in the event that the legislator does 
not establish any burden of liability on the perpetrator for damage caused by 
him,  there  will  be  no  incentive  for  this  perpetrator  to  conduct  himself 
carefully and it is the potentially aggrieved who will take precautions, being 
mindful  that  the  weight  of  the  possible  damage  caused  by  the  tort 
perpetrator will be borne by him.  
Thus,  here  the  aggrieved  entity  is  burdened  with  both  the  costs 
associated  with  the  damage  as  well  as  the  requirement  to  employ 
precautions in order to reduce the risk of suffering this damage. Both of 
these  burdens  will  be  borne  by  him  as  long  as  it  remains  economically 
effective to do so, that is as long as increasing expenditures for precautions 
will result in a reduction of the expected costs associated with the damage. 
Here the aggrieved will be motivated to achieve an economically optimal 
level by reaching the marginal value of costs and benefits flowing from the 
employed  precautions.  In  the  event  of  a  legal  solution  under  which  tort 
liability  is  based  on  the  risk  principle,  assuming  perfect  compensation 
(meaning it is equal to damage) for damage suffered by the aggrieved, there 
is no incentive for him to undertake preventative action.16 This is because 
incurring costs associated with such means would not yield any benefits in 
the form of a reduction in the probability of an accident. In this case 
different incentives influence the potential tort perpetrator, who, on the 
grounds of liability b ased on the risk principle under the assumption of 
complete compensation, is obligated to pay in full for all damage he causes. 
Therefore, he is motivated to maintain an economically effective level of 
caution in his conduct in order to attain the marginal   value of costs of 
carefulness and the benefits flowing thereof. These deliberations lead to the 
conclusion that the adoption of a lack of liability on the part of tortfeasors 
for damage caused by them should be preferred within those areas in which 
only  potential  victims  have  the  ability  to  undertake  means  to  prevent 
accidents or decrease the risk thereof, whereas the adoption of the risk 
principle as justifying tortfeasor’s liability is advisable when only he may 
undertake means to prevent accidents.17                           
 
 
                                                                                                                            
circumstances requiring demonstration), whereas the application of liability in tort based on 
the principle of risk implicates bringing more compensation claims, which are easier to 
adjudicate (Cooter and Ulen (n 5) 438.  
16 It seems that this may pertain at most to losses to chattels, but not to non -material losses 
to a person. Furthermore, the assumption of full, perpetually available loss compensation 
seems unrealistic. This will be discussed in more detail in the article.   
17 R Cooter and T Ulen, Law and Economics (4th ed, Pearson Addison Wesley 2003) 323-
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B. The bilateral model  
In respect of bilateral accidents it should be borne in mind that, due 
to the aforementioned significance of the behaviour of both parties to the 
probability  of  occurrence  of  damage,  the  behaviour  of  the  damage 
perpetrator is often related to the conduct of the other party.  
In such cases, if the legislator does not establish  the perpetrator’s 
liability,  similarly  to  the  unilateral  model  a  potential  perpetrator  has  no 
motivation to exercise carefulness in his activities. This burden will fall on 
the potentially aggrieved, which stems from the fact that they will incur the 
entire burden of the damage, by which they will be effectively motivated to 
undertake precautions. The situation is reversed if the legislator establishes 
perpetrator liability based on the risk principle, as then the obligation to pay 
compensation will rest on the perpetrator, by which he will be inclined to 
maintain carefulness as  opposed to the aggrieved whose damage will be 
compensated by the perpetrator in every case.18 Thus, it is difficult to judge 
both such situations as satisfactory and socially optimal. Other principles of 
liability in tort are more favourable to the achievement of such a result, for 
example perpetrator liability based on the principle of risk but modified by 
the possibility of raising a charge of contribution of the aggrieved. In such a 
case the maintenance of an appropriate level of carefulness by the aggrieved 
results in a shift of the entire burden of compensation  for damage onto its 
perpetrator, whereas insufficient carefulness on the part of the aggrieved 
leads to the conclusion that he contributed to the occurrence of damage and 
therefore  should  also  bear  some  of  the  burden  of  damage.  Thus,  the 
aggrieved will be motivated to maintain an appropriate level of carefulness, 
and tortfeasors, being able to assume such conduct on the part of potential 
victims, will also act in a careful manner in order to avoid the need to pay 
compensation. This mechanism works equally w ell on the principle of a 
mirror image in relation to the aggrieved, that is, assuming careful conduct 
by  a  potential  perpetrator  unwilling  to  bear  the  costs  of  damage 
compensation, the aggrieved will also behave with appropriate carefulness. 
The distribution of factors affecting the behaviour of people in the 
event of defining fault as the principle for liability is slightly different. Here, 
under the assumption that the level of carefulness required by the courts is 
optimal, the perpetrators will strive to observe it due to the profitability of 
this method in the context of minimising the risk of causing damage and 
bearing the costs associated with compensation. At the same time, the 
possibility of forecasting the observance of carefulness by the perpetrat ors 
that would prevent them from facing charges of fault and the ensuing 
burden of an obligation to pay  compensation simultaneously  acts  as a 
stimulus for the aggrieved who, in the event of a lack of carefulness within 
the scope of his own activity, will bear the burden of damage alone.  
However, if the situation is slightly different, that is when fault is the 
binding principle of liability, but with the possibility of raising a charge of 
contribution by the aggrieved, the obligation to compensate damage l ies on 
the perpetrator only if in a given situational set he is the only party failing to 
                                                 
18 However, see comment in footnote 16. 70  Wroclaw Review of Law, Administration & Economics  [Vol 2:2 
 
observe the minimum  necessary  carefulness,  assuming the aggrieved has 
maintained the required degree of carefulness. The lack of an appropriate 
level of carefulness on the part of the latter (or a higher level, which would 
no longer be a socially optimal one) leads to an outcome under which the 
economic burden of the damage will be located within his assets and the 
perpetrator will be free from such. Again, the role of the courts seems of 
particular significance here, because if they define the level of appropriate 
carefulness  at  a  socially  optimal  level  then  both  perpetrators  and  the 
aggrieved will strive to observe it, having a real and solid basis to assume 
that the opposing party will act rationally so as to avoid the necessity of 
bearing  the  material  consequences  associated  with  compensation  for 
damage and will also observe this socially optimal level of carefulness.19 
Nevertheless, it is indicated in the literature that the introduction of the fault 
principle with a modification allowing the possibility to take into account an 
additional element in the form of the contribution of the aggrieved to the 
occurrence of damage is not required, as the goal of inducing the a ggrieved 
to observe careful conduct in his activities  (which is a socially desirable and 
optimum effect) is achieved by mechanisms governing the behaviour of the 
parties on the grounds of  ‘pure’ fault principle.20 Certainly in both cases a 
very powerful motivation is present for the perpetrators to behave carefully, 
however this element does not raise any doubts in the light of model 
assumptions adopted at the time of establishing tortious liability of the 
perpetrator based on the principle of fault or the  principle of fault with the 
charge of aggrieved contribution, whereby the perpetrator is assumed to be 
the primary entity to which compensatory liability is assigned. Similarly, the 
element of motivating the perpetrator to act with an appropriate level of 
carefulness will be present when the legislator applies a method based on a 
comparison  of  fault.  Here  as  well  the  perpetrator  will  escape  the 
requirement to pay compensation if he has exhibited appropriate carefulness 
in  his  actions.  A  significant  differen ce  within  the  scope  of  incentives 
stemming from the form of legal regulations shaping the actions of entities 
in a given situation occurs within the boundaries of the principle of fault 
comparison when the standard for conduct reflecting the level of appropriate 
carefulness is met by neither the perpetrator nor the aggrieved. In such a 
situation, given the aforementioned liability principle, both parties (that is, 
both the perpetrator and the aggrieved) have to compensate for the damage 
resulting from an accident or other damage-causing incident, whereas the 
participation of each party in this cost is dependent upon the degree to 
which their conduct diverged from the established socially optimal level of 
appropriately careful behaviour. And thus, under an ap propriate – that is, 
economically effective – establishment of a model of required appropriate 
carefulness, both the perpetrator and aggrieved will be inclined to observe it. 
Thus, despite different  constructions  of the legal  incentives  affecting the 
motivation of the parties for choosing their method of conduct, the final 
result  as  to  the  preferences  of  the  parties  is  the  same  as  in  the  case  of 
perpetrator liability based on the principle of fault or on the principle of 
                                                 
19 P Diamond, ‘Accident Law and Resource Allocation’ (1974) 10 BJE 366-405; Schäfer 
and Ott (n 8) 189. 
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fault with the possibility to raise charges of contribution by the aggrieved to 
the occurrence of damage.  
In light of the above comments, it should be considered that basing 
liability on the principle of risk with the possibility of bringing up charges 
of contribution by the aggrieved as well as on the principle of fault, the 
principle of fault with the option to take into account the contribution of the 
aggrieved and the principle of comparison of fault leads to socially optimal 
results.21  In all of these combinations, with the aid of multid irectional 
motivational  factors,  a  situation  is  achieved  in  which  the  parties  are 
effectively motivated to pay attention so that, within the scope of their 
activities, the appropriate level of carefulness is observed. Such a result is 
not achieved by estab lishing regulations which do not take into account 
perpetrator liability for damage suffered as a result of his acts or omissions 
or by founding his liability on a simple principle of risk. 
Despite  the  fact  that  as  many  as  four  of  the  aforementioned 
combinations of liability principles lead to results desired by a rationally 
acting  legislator,  their  structures  differ  significantly,  and  the  boundary 
between the principle of fault in all its versions and the principle of risk is 
clear.  This  is  manifested  not  only  in  the  aforementioned  various 
distributions of incentives with the aim of inclining the parties to maintain 
the  desired  carefulness  in  activities.  Differences  also  occur  within  the 
procedural sphere, by the establishment of the necessary scope of evid ence 
and  the  ensuing  scope  of  administrative  costs  associated  with  the 
functioning of particular liability principles in practice. This stems from the 
general ascertainment that, to obtain a court verdict awarding the claimed 
compensation on the grounds of the fault principle, it is required not only to 
demonstrate  the  occurrence  of  the  fact  constituting  the  source  of  the 
damage, the damage itself and the cause -and-effect relationship between 
them (just as under the risk principle), but furthermore it is necessary for the 
court to establish such a level of appropriate carefulness which is, in given 
circumstances, socially optimal and economically effective, as well as a 
demonstration by the aggrieved that the perpetrator did not observe such 
carefulness in his own actions.  
It transpires that not only is the legislator’s choice of principle for a 
given category of situations of significance, but equally important in the 
determination of the effects of principles of liability on the behaviour of 
potential  damage  perpetrators  and  aggrieved  is  how  they  function  in 
everyday life, and thus what factors, be they from the perspective of case 
law, economic mechanisms or psychological factors, become relevant for 
the functioning of particular liability principles and additionally shape the 
behaviour of people under a given legal regime. Among the most important 
factors  are  the  methods  which  will  be  employed  by  the  courts  for 
                                                 
21 Polinsky (n 14) 50. It should be remembered that these options of ‘combinations of 
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determining the level of required appropriate carefulness and their capacity 
to  do  so  at  a  socially  optimal  level,  as  well  as  the  fact  that  the  parties' 
inclination to undertake behaviour which could result in the occurrence of 
damage is not only affected by the principle governing their liability but 
also the scale of their activity, how often they undertake it, what their profits 
from  it  are  and  what  the  probability  of  causing  damage  is.  No  less 
significant  are  factors  of  a  very  subjective  character,  such  as  a  general 
willingness to assume risk.  
 
C. The level of appropriate carefulness 
The correct functioning of the incentives envisaged by the legislator 
which are to affect the behaviour of the parties in situations where liability 
is based on the fault principle, is dependent to a large extent on how courts 
in  practice  establish  the  level  of  appropriate  carefulness.  Only  a  proper 
definition thereof leads to the attainment of socially beneficial results, which 
will minimise social cost to the largest possible extent. 
In general it is indicated that, in the process of reasoning which is to 
achieve the establishment of a model for the proper level of carefulness 
required in a given situation, first and foremost the costs associated with the 
undertaking of individual behaviour reducing the risk of causing damage or 
eliminating them entirely should be taken into account, as well as the danger 
of causing damage as a (usually secondary) consequence of one’s acts or 
omissions. In balancing the relation between these elements some authors 
propose  that  rules  of  equity  should  be  followed22,  whereas others prefer 
calling upon more measurable and material factors such as the probability of 
damage occurring, its potential scope, whether only assets are in danger or 
also  a  person’s  well-being,  how  large  the  group  subject  to  the  potential 
effects of the danger is, and whether the perpetrator could reduce the danger 
he  generated  with  relative  ease  or  rather  only  by  incurring  significant 
expense.23 
Generally speaking, if the precautions undertaken by the damage 
perpetrator are less than appropriate, then the marginal social cost associated 
with undertaking these means is less than the associated value of marginal 
social benefit, whereas if the perpetrator undertakes precautions greater than 
those  indicated  by  effectiveness  reasons,  the  marginal  social  costs 
associated  with  observing  this  carefulness  exceeds  the  ensuing  social 
benefits. This supports the conclusion that it is economically effective in 
such cases for the perpetrator to apply reduced preventative means. 24 In the 
former  situation,  to  achieve  an  economically  effec tive  outcome  the 
perpetrator should observe a higher level of carefulness than that which was 
actually applied by him, so from the perspective of an economic analysis of 
his behaviour it is justified to charge him with not observing the appropriate 
level  of  carefulness  in  his  activities.  On  the  other  hand,  in  the  latter 
situation, the damage perpetrator has observed an even higher level of 
carefulness than that indicated by principles of economic effectiveness, and 
there is no way to charge him with not observing appropriate carefulness. In 
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such an event, he will be free from liability based on the principle of fault in 
the form of negligence. 
The  most  precise  concept  regarding  the  establishment  of  the 
appropriate level of carefulness, applying mathematical tools, was proposed 
by Judge Learned Hand on the basis of one of his cases.25 Due to its clarity 
and operability, this method has gained broad acceptance in case law. 26 
Hand took into account three main elements, that is the cost of undertaking 
preventative  means  which  he  designated  B  (burden  of  the  cost  of  the 
precaution),  the  probability  of  the  occurrence  of  loss  if  no  preventative 
means are employed (designated P for probability) and the scope of the loss 
(designated  L  for  loss).  He  then  indicated  that  one  may  speak  of  the 
perpetrator not observing the appropriate carefulness, and thus of his fault, 
only if  B<PL, that is  when the costs associated with  the undertaking of 
precautions  by  the  perpetrator  were  smaller  in  a  given  case  than  the 
probability  of  damage  occurring  under  the  conditions  of  no  preventative 
measures  being  undertaken  by  the  perpetrator  multiplied  by  the  damage 
value.  Only  in  such  a  situation  would  it  be  sensible  and  economically 
optimal to require the potential perpetrator to undertake measures to protect 
his surroundings from suffering damage.27 
However,  in  practice  Hand’s  formula  appears  to  be  an  imperfect 
solution.28 Firstly, it is has been observed that it requires improvement by 
defining  the scope  of  i ts  application,  as  it  does  not  exceed  the  limits 
established by measuring and comparing the marginal expected costs of an 
accident (in terms of damage which requires compensation) with the costs 
of  preventative  measures.  Here  it  is  recommended  to  carry  out   an 
assessment  of  the  expenditures  and  profits  associated with  incremental 
increases in safety (in other words, with a gradual decrease in the risk of 
causing damage), and to acknowledge that it is rational and optimal that the 
potential  perpetrator  should   stop  employing  further  damage  prevention 
precautions  at  the  moment  when  each  additional  dollar  spent  for  this 
purpose would generate additional safety of a value equal or less to that 
dollar. Such a metric indicates a marginal point of appropriate carefulness in 
the sense that, even though it will not be possible to hold a perpetrator who 
has observed an even higher level of carefulness than the one defined in this 
manner at fault, the costs incurred on damage prevention means exceed 
ensuing profits generated within the scope of reductions of expected costs 
associated with the possible damage; consequently, activities intended to 
increase safety and minimise potential losses will not be economically 
                                                 
25 In particular the justification of verdict in the United States v Carroll Towing Co., 159 
F.2d 169 (2nd Cir. 1947) case.  
26 For example, it was applied in the case Bammerlin v Navistar Intl. Transport. Corp., 30 
F.3d 898, 902 (7th Cir. 1993). 
27 In other words, under Hand’s formula, a defined measure of preventative means exists, 
the application of which is economically rational, dependent upon the probability, or risk of 
causing a loss (Schäfer and Ott (n 8) 136).  
28 See inter alia comments on this matter and Hand’s formula modification in Cooter and 
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justified.29  Furthermore,  it  is  considered  that  Hand’s  formula  is  only 
effective when the perpetrator’s behaviour leads to a total elimination of the 
possibility of causing damage, excluding cases in which only a reduction 
occurs rather than complete elimination. Therefore, for situations in which 
the applied precautions only reduce to a certain extent the risk of causing 
damage, it is proposed to amend the aforementioned formula by taking into 
account two additional factors; namely, the probability of damage occurring 
when steps are taken which aim to prevent it (hereinafter designated P2) as 
well as the expected value of loss in a situation where the potential damage 
perpetrator undertakes precautions (hereinafter L). Under such a formula, 
non-compliance  with  the  required  appropriate  carefulness,  and  therefore 
fault for causing damage will occur if  P2L + B < P1L, meaning that the 
level of damage that would occur as the result of a tort multiplied by the 
probability  of  its  occurrence  when  damage  prevention  means  are  not 
undertaken (P1L) would exceed  the  sum of costs of preventative means (B) 
and  the level of damage multiplied by  its probability in a situation when 
the perpetrator undertook preventative measures (P2L).30 
Interestingly,  despite  the  fact  that  Hand’s  formula  is  designed  to 
perform  an  assessment  of  whether  the  perpetrator  observed  appropriate 
standards of carefulness and therefore whether he is free from liability or 
not based on the principle of fault, thereby resulting in it being justified to 
attribute faulty behaviour to him, an attempt surfaced in literature to use this 
formula in relation to strict liability (liability based on the principle of risk), 
although  not,  of  course,  to  assess  whether  the  perpetrator  observed 
appropriate carefulness within the scope of his activity, since that is legally 
irrelevant  for  assigning  responsibility  for  damage  under  the  principle  of 
strict liability. Here Hand’s formula was used as a tool for determining the 
hypothetical conduct of a potential tortfeasor. Namely, it was indicated that 
if the level of costs to be borne from the application of means to prevent 
damage to others is lower than the product of the probability of causing 
damage when no precautions are taken and the value of these losses, then 
the tortfeasor, faced with the perspective of strict liability, will be inclined 
to prevent accidents in order to reduce the costs he would incur, and thus 
will act just as he would when his liability is based on the fault principle. 
The tort perpetrator whose liability will be based on the principle of risk will 
act in the same way as under the fault principle, that is to say he will not 
observe  the  required  carefulness  if  the  aforementioned  proportions  are 
reversed; in other words, when the cost of applying preventative measures 
exceeds the product of the level of probability of the occurrence of damage 
and its possible cost. From a comparison of these costs it will follow that 
undertaking preventative measures is simply not profitable.31 
 
D.  Frame  of  reference  –  standard  behaviour  of  a  reasonable 
person 
Based on objective factors and strictly mathematical calculations in 
Hand’s formula, the question arises of whether, and if so to what extent, 
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subjective elements should be taken into account; that is, if in determining 
the model level of appropriate carefulness the individual characteristics of a 
given  person  should  be  taken  into  account,  his  capacity  to  undertake 
precautions,  his  wealth,  his  psychological  and  physical  state,  family 
situation, abilities and education. In the literature it is highlighted that it 
would  be  advisable  under  the  various  conditions  in  which  individuals 
operate  to  take  into  consideration  their  individual  abilities  and  financial 
capacity in respect of undertaking damage prevention means.32 In case law 
practice a standard model is usu ally adopted for appropriate carefulness, 
referring to a reasonably acting person who would find himself in such a 
situation as the party to a given proceedings. It has been observed that 
courts are willing to take into consideration individual characteristics of the 
damage perpetrator or the situation in which he finds himself only if the cost 
of establishing them remains low. Assuming a particular characteristic is 
easy to establish, usually at first glance, such as when the tort perpetrator is 
a disabled individual, such an operation would thus be conducted.33 
 
E.  Other  factors  of  significance  for  the  choice  of  an  optimal 
principle of liability 
  It is obvious that every model of economic analysis of individual 
legal institutions is based on certain idealistic assumptions, adopted a priori 
and thus restricting the background of the deliberations.34 This is necessary 
insofar as in practice it is not possible to take into consideration all of the 
factors affecting human decisions. However, oversimplification of discourse 
should be avoided, as accounting for too few relevant elements may lead to 
a false picture of how the actions of parties in respect of tortious liability 
based on particular principles may be shaped. 
In order to simplify analysis and to obtain g reater transparency it is 
generally assumed that people make decisions which are rational for their 
own good; that there are no legal regulations which lead to a reduction in 
external costs; that all tortfeasors are solvent at the time when compensation 
is to be paid, as a result of which full compensation for the damage caused 
by  them  is  guaranteed;  and  most  importantly  it  is  assumed  that 
administrative costs are equal to zero, and the functioning of insurance 
systems and the influence of its availability on the behaviour of individuals 
is not taken into account. This does not belittle the fact that in real life such 
factors undoubtedly do have what is frequently a very significant influence 
on decisions concerning conduct made by  an individual when the law  
stipulates tortious liability based on a particular principle as well as in the 
absence of such liability. 
  With  reference  to  the  assumption  on  the  rationality  of  actions 
undertaken by individuals it should be indicated that, along the lines of the 
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assumptions  of  the  economic  law  school  of  thought,  individuals  taking 
decisions about whether to undertake various activities weigh the associated 
risks and rewards, and then choose the one which proves the most useful as 
determined in the course of that reasoning. However, it seems that this is a 
false assumption to a certain extent, as it is based on the non-realistic belief 
in people’s perfect knowledge about all the costs and risk associated with 
particular  actions;  in  reality  it  is  imperfect,  and  it  would  seem  to  be 
appropriate to take this incomplete availability of data into account when 
conducting analyses. In this context one should consider people’s tendency 
to  underestimate  the  importance  of  most  events  by  associating  a  low 
probability of the occurrence of damage with them, along with those which 
occur rarely and are not often remembered. One should also consider the 
tendency  to  overestimate  the  danger  which  may  ensue  from  some  other 
types of activities which carry a small risk of causing injury but are more 
frequently  and  dramatically  depicted  as  a  source  of  danger  (e.g.  in  the 
media).35 Therefore, in respect of activities in relation to which their danger 
is underestimated, people will behave with insufficient carefulness, whereas 
when overestimating risk they will tend to take excessive precautions; in 
neither situation will an economically effective outcome be achieved. 
When considering the realities of everyday life, it seems overly -
idealistic to assume the solvency of damage perpetrators and the ensui ng 
full compensation for the damage which the aggrieved entities suffer, as it is 
quite often the case that the limited financial capabilities of the perpetrators 
of damage constitute an insurmountable barrier beyond which they are 
simply unable to pay com pensation.36 This threshold is usually quite low 
when it comes to individuals or enterprises run on a small scale, whereas it 
may be higher with reference to larger corporations. However, even in the 
case of the latter, it may not be assumed that there is a one-hundred-percent 
guarantee  of  receiving  full  compensation  from  them,  especially  if 
businessmen  sometimes  intentionally  act  to  avoid  the  payment  of 
compensation (eg by conducting activities which may constitute a potential 
source  of  damage  outside  the  f ramework  of  the  core  enterprises,  for 
example within the scope of legally separate subsidiaries, by which the 
liability will be limited to the assets of such a company, which by design 
will be insignificant37). The undertaking of such activities by entrepreneurs 
is especially prevalent when their liability in tort is based on the more 
rigorous risk principle, where just the fact itself of causing damage results in 
liability, while less so against the backdrop of the fault principle in the form 
of negligence, under which the entrepreneur has at his disposal a simpler 
                                                 
35  D  Kahneman,  A  Tversky,  Judgement  under  uncertainty:  biases  and  heuristics 
(Cambridge University Press 1981); TS Ulen, ‘Rational Choice and the Economic Analysis 
of Law – Law and Social Inquiry’ in  R Koroblein and TS Ulen, ‘Law and Behavioral 
Science: Removing the Rationality Assumption from Law and Economics’ (2000) 88 CLR 
1051; Schäfer and Ott (n 8) 229.  
36 Additionally, the possibility to moderate the amount of compensation by the court may 
be indicated (see art 440 of the Polish Civil Code) by which it may also not lead to full 
compensation. 
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way  of  avoiding  liability  by  observing  appropriate  carefulness  in  his 
activities.38 
Aside from the aforementioned considerations, an assumption of 
complete compensation for damage suffered by aggrieved entities transpires 
to be an illusion, especially in the non-material context of personal injuries, 
as some harm in the form of death or serious injury as well as negative 
psychological experiences, pain or emotional suffering simply cannot be 
expressed by a given monetary amount that would constitute compensation 
(money will never compensate the loss of a loved one). Furthermore, it 
should  be  noted  that  in  the  event  of  a  danger  to  life  and  health  the 
potentially  aggrieved  individuals  will  tend  to  unde rtake  appropriate 
precautions on their part, even in a situation where a certain principle is 
established by law on which the tort perpetrator’s liability is such that the 
tortfeasor’s obligation to pay compensation will not be diminished in any 
way, even if the aggrieved had not observed appropriate carefulness in their 
own behaviour. Here the fundamental motivation of potential victims for 
observing  carefulness  will  stem  not  from  visions  of  receiving  or  not 
receiving compensation, but from the wish to avoid death or serious injuries, 
as  these  definitely  represent  a  greater  value.  It  is  possible  that  the 
perspective of redress in the event of personal injury may lead to a very 
slight reduction in their carefulness, but this is doubtful. The reduction in 
the level of precautions undertaken by potentially aggrieved entities seems 
at its most possible with reference to the threat of damage restricted solely 
to assets.39 Furthermore, there is no doubt that an extremely important factor 
determining the behaviour of individuals in practice, including the decision 
to pursue a compensation claim from the perpetrator of a given injury on the 
grounds of his liability in tort based on a defined principle, is the issue of 
the necessity to bear the costs associated with br inging a suit against the 
tortfeasor, especially in the context of the overall profitability of actioning 
such  claims.  These  costs  are  usually  identified  as  the  costs  of  court 
proceedings,  although  the  position  is  also  emerging  to  understand  this 
concept  in  a  broader  sense  by  including  the  expenses  associated  with 
entering into settlements and even the costs associated with the time, effort 
and emotions sacrificed.40 A significant influence on the behaviour that has 
developed among legal entities due to the governance of individual liability 
in tort principles has also undoubtedly been the availability of insurance 
policies pertaining to the civil liability of potential perpetrators, as well as 
those  for  the  potentially  aggrieved,  against  personal  injury  or  d amage 
suffered as a result of the actions of other persons.  This mostly stems from 
the fact that in the event such an insurance agreement is entered into, the 
entire system of incentives which are to affect the behaviour of potential tort 
perpetrators and entities incurring a damage as the result, which was shaped 
as a result of legal solutions establishing liability in tort based on a given 
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principle,  becomes  distorted.41  Another  important  factor  affecting  the 
possibility of causing damage and its scope is  whether a given entity will 
undertake a given activity, and for how long. 42 For a detailed discussion of 
the significance of all the factors given herein, i.e. administrative costs, 
insurance policies, the level of an entity's activity etc., one is referred to the 
literature on the subject due to the limited scope of this work. 43 However, it 
remains beyond doubt that they are among the most significant to be taken 
into  account  when  conducting  economic  analysis  of  the  principles  of 
liability in tort.  
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
In light of the observations made in this article one should conclude 
that  economic  analysis  of  law  is  not  a  perfect  method,  but  one  which 
undoubtedly limits the scope of consideration and treats the issue of the 
functioning of law solely through the prism of economic principles, passing 
over  other  important  factors.  There  are  also  objections  raised  in  the 
literature that this is not a scientific method but only a normative variety of 
the economically-oriented policy of law, mostly due to the fact that because 
of the significant number of assumptions which are impossible to verify, it 
is difficult to acknowledge its descriptive character.44 The proponents of this 
method themselves are aware of its limitations, such as the conventionality 
of some assumptions or the fact that it is practically impossible to express 
them in a manner which does not raise doubts. The assumption that man is 
homo  economicus,  making  the  most  efficient  choices  for  himself  raises 
objections, because such an attitude not only fails to take into account other 
important  factors  influencing  the  human  decision  processes,  such  as 
emotions  or  psyche  (which  often  lead  to  irrational  behaviour  from  an 
economic point of view), but also elements operating within the sphere of 
economics, such as the wealth effect or the manner of presenting available 
options for choice and the freedom of such choice. 
Nevertheless,  it  should  be  acknowledged  that  pointing  out  the 
imperfections and gaps in the applied method is in itself valuable, as this 
leads to its continual improvement. The conclusions obtained in the course 
of  reasoning  will  obviously  be  more  correct  when  a  greater  volume  of 
situational factors is taken into account and the data better reflect reality. 
However,  for  methodological  reasons  it  is  impossible  to  take  into 
consideration all of the aspects in all possible situations which are taken into 
account  by  individuals  making  decisions  as  to  undertaking  or  refraining 
from actions which may bear a risk of causing damage to someone else. 
Omitting the practical impossibility of doing so, such a detailed analysis 
would  not  yield  results  on  a  level  sufficiently  general  for  formulating 
principles  of  broad  and  universal  significance  with  aspirations  to  be 
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representative for a given society. Thus an attempt to establish economic 
rules adequate for everyone requires a certain, sometimes significant level 
of generalisation. 
  In  light  of  the  above,  the  application  of  the  tools  of  economic 
analysis  to  law,  both  for  the  assessment  of  existing  legal  regulations 
pertaining to liability in tort, as well as for the needs of formulating de lege 
ferenda postulates, seems helpful; nevertheless, due to the aforementioned 
limitations, it should be treated as a supplement, and never the primary nor 
sole method of assessing legal regulations. 
 
 
 
 
 
 